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Executive summary
This report takes as its starting point the anger currently felt by too many of our fellow citizens. 
It asks whether a rising sense of unfairness may be fuelling it. 
There are always people who feel that society is unfair but, today, there are simply too 
many of them. Why is this? What has gone wrong? How can our political leaders fashion 
a set of policies which will deliver a society which sufficient numbers of people at least 
believe to be sufficiently fair?
This report is novel in three ways:
First, it acknowledges that fairness is subjective. All human beings care passionately 
about it. But they have very different ways of defining it. This has been demonstrated by 
behavioural science research. 
So, rather than imposing an arbitrary definition of fairness, the report examines different 
possible angles. 
It tackles both income inequality and equality of opportunity – because people will have 
different views as to their relative importance. It reveals some, frankly shocking, facts, 
for example:
• Income inequality has increased markedly in many EU countries since the mid-
1980s. This development is mainly due to a broadening between the top and the 
bottom earners. From mid-1980s to 2008, the average annual real disposable 
income of the richest 10% increased more than 2.5 faster than that of poorest 
10%.
• Individuals who have at least one tertiary educated parent have twice the chance 
to reach tertiary education themselves.
• Individuals whose parents have not achieved tertiary education have significantly 
lower literacy and numeracy scores. Those who are also first or second generation 
immigrants and who report bad health fare even worse. 
• Individuals with a poor family background are more likely to smoke or be 
overweight or obese than their counterparts from a privileged family background 
and they are less likely to have exercised in the past seven days.
• The chances of reporting poor health for those with a poor family background are 
almost 110% higher than for respondents with a privileged family background, 
even when biological dimensions (age and gender) are accounted for.
• Almost half (44.5%) of the EU population has insufficient skills to participate in the 
digital economy and society. Seventeen Member States have rates higher than this.
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Secondly, it incorporates the spatial dimension of fairness. It finds 
great heterogeneity, not just across Member States, but regions too. 
There are large spatial disparities in terms of income, income inequality, 
unemployment, the share of people with tertiary education and access to 
basic services. This shows that a serious investigation of fairness must 
therefore focus on the sub-national level. Working solely with national 
averages is dangerous because it risks missing major disparities within 
countries. It also risks missing reasons for the popular discontent. This 
is visible across the developed world (and maybe other countries too), 
suggesting some common themes. At the same time, the reasons for it are 
likely to vary from one place to another. 
Finally, the report explicitly tackles the issue of perceptions and attitudes. 
It produces some intriguing insights:
• There is some evidence that people over-estimate income 
differences. However, data from 2009 indicate that concern about 
inequality does mirror measured inequality, at least to some extent. 
• Perceived inequality is a driver of individuals’ attitudes towards 
redistribution. The more people agree that income differences are too 
large in their country, the more they want governments to take action 
to reduce them. 
• They are more likely to tolerate income inequality if they perceive 
there to be a high degree of equality of opportunity (though this 
attitude is most prevalent in the US). 
• However, popular perceptions of inequality of opportunity are only 
weakly linked to objective measures of the same phenomenon.
• Inequality can result from good or bad luck (rather than effort or 
opportunity). Attitudes to this kind of inequality are influenced by 
culture. 
• Perceptions of fairness are highly influenced by reference points. 
People base their fairness judgment of the outcome of a given 
behaviour at least partly on a comparison of the situation of others 
or a situation that occurred in the past. 
• However, it may be that people in countries or regions use different 
points of comparison. This could explain why, even though different 
regions have undergone changes in different directions, populist 
disaffection is on the rise everywhere.
• People care not just about 'distributive justice' – the share of 
resources or opportunities they get – but also how the decision was 
taken – i.e. 'procedural justice'.
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Disaffection among large sections of the EU 
population is growing. It is fuelling support for 
populist parties, which are often anti-EU. 
It is very important that EU politicians and 
policy makers listen to this populist signal and 
understand it, so that they can respond to it more 
effectively and re-connect with these citizens.
Many factors may be driving citizens' frustration. 
Some of these factors are not economic, or not 
obviously so. For example, people may be anxious 
about losing their cultural identity in the face of 
globalisation.
However, this report focuses on a possible driver, 
which is largely economic: fairness. 
Economics focuses on efficiency in the allocation 
of resources. It can measure the inequality in 
distribution but has no scientifically underpinned 
message on the appropriate distribution of 
resources. Instead, people make value judgements 
about what they consider fair.
This report therefore takes an open approach. It 
begins by examining three different inequalities – 
because different people will have different views 
as to their relative importance: 
Chapter one examines long and short-term 
trends in income inequality. These are driven 
primarily by changes in underlying market income 
inequality, as well as changes in tax and benefit 
policies. 
Many factors may be driving market income 
inequality, for example, changing trade patterns 
or the effects of labour market policies and 
institutions. However, this chapter looks at just one 
of the potential drivers: digitisation. 
It also presents evidence on the redistributive 
effect of tax and benefits systems in the EU, their 
automatic stabilisation properties and the impact 
of tax policy changes since the crisis. 
Chapter two assesses equality of opportunity 
in the EU. It focuses on the impact of family 
background on education and health outcomes. 
Chapter three looks at the spatial inequalities 
because a person's life chances are also affected 
by where they live. 
The fourth chapter of the report tackles the issue 
of attitudes and perceptions. Using survey data, 
it asks how people perceive inequality and how 
much of it they are prepared to tolerate. It looks at 
how people form their judgments about fairness 
and how they react when they feel they have been 
treated unfairly. 
This report is just a tentative first step towards 
building a knowledge base to support policies 
aimed at building a society that people feel is fair. 
Its final chapter identifies possible future research 
themes that DG JRC may wish to work on in the 
coming years.
Introduction
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Income inequality
This chapter asks how equal the EU is and 
whether it is becoming more or less equal. It 
finds that:
 f Inequality within many countries has 
increased since the 1980s, while inequality 
between countries has broadly declined.
 f A closer look at the pre-, during and post-crisis 
period (2006-2012) confirms that inequality 
declined in the EU as a whole, with the bottom 
30% of households gaining. However, this was 
driven mainly by improvements in the position 
of these households in CEE (Central and 
Eastern Europe) Member States. 
 f All households lost in both the Mediterranean 
and the North West European Member 
States. In the Mediterranean Member States, 
inequality increased. In the North West 
European Member States, it decreased. 
 f Income inequality varies significantly, 
between countries, but also between regions.
Rising inequality is shaped largely by two factors: 
changes in underlying market income inequality 
and changes in tax and benefits policies.
This chapter looks at one of a number of 
potential drivers of market income inequality: 
digitisation. It appears that it has resulted in 
job, but not wage, polarisation in Europe. The 
relationship between routinisation, inequality and 
job/wage polarisation needs further exploration. 
Authors disagree about how many jobs will 
be replaced in the future by automation. The 
other question is whether new jobs will emerge 
to replace them. Some commentators believe 
that automation may mean the ‘end of work.' 
However, there is no sign of this, as yet.
The rise of the collaborative economy may 
spell the end of permanent, full time jobs, as 
more and more people become ‘independent 
service providers’ or ‘independent contractors'. 
More empirical evidence is needed to 
understand its net effects on labour markets. 
In this new, more fluid world of work, people 
will have to be more flexible but not everyone 
has the tools to do this. Skills are unevenly 
distributed.
In terms of tax and benefits policies, this 
chapter finds that:
 f Direct tax and social benefit systems have 
sizeable redistributive impacts in the EU, 
though the degree of redistribution achieved 
varies a great deal between countries.
 f A significant degree of automatic 
stabilisation is achieved through tax 
and social benefits systems across all 
EU countries and household categories, 
with the burden falling largely on direct 
personal taxes, rather than social security 
contributions and social benefits. 
 f However, social benefits play a much larger 
role for the poorest households. Income 
stabilisation for these households is much 
larger and more heterogeneous across EU 
countries.
 f In countries where major fiscal consolidation 
programmes have been undertaken, these 
programmes have tended to amplify the 
negative effect of the crisis on households´ 
disposable income.
Chapter Summary
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1.  Fredriksen, Kaja B., Income 
inequality in the European 
Union, OECD Economic 
Department Working Papers 
No. 952, 2012.
2.  The Gini coefficient is an 
overall measure of inequality. 
Its value is between zero 
and one. Zero indicates 
full equality, while one 
corresponds to the highest 
possible inequality (everything 
is held by a single individual).
 
3.  Ventiles divide a distribution 
into 20 equal parts. They 
are similar to the better-
known deciles, but provide 
finer resolution. The income 
concept used here is 
disposable household income 
with the following income 
components: labour income, 
capital income, private and 
governmental transfers 
and benefits net of taxes. 
It is measured in Euros 
at 2005 prices, adjusted 
for purchasing power as 
compared to EU 25 average 
and equivalised for individuals 
within the households. After 
these corrections, they 
represent income available 
for spending for an average 
individual, comparable across 
time and countries.
4.  We define North-West 
Europe as being above, 
Mediterranean and Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
as being below the EU-
average of pre-crisis GDP per 
capita (in 2006, Italy being 
borderline but assigned to 
Mediterranean). North-West 
Europe includes AT, BE, DE, 
DK, FI, FR, IE, LU, NL, SE and 
UK; Mediterranean includes 
EL, ES, IT, PT, CY and MT; 
Central and Eastern Europe 
includes SK, SI, CZ, P,L HU, EE, 
LV, LT, RO and BG.
1.1 Long and short‑term trends
There is clear evidence that income inequality has increased markedly 
within many EU countries since the mid-1980s (see Figure 1 for selected 
Member States and other OECD countries). This development is mainly due 
to a broadening between the top and the bottom earners. From mid-1980s 
to 2008,1 the average annual real disposable income of the richest 10% 
increased more than 2.5 faster than that of poorest 10%.
When looking at the development of inequality within the EU as a whole, 
a different pattern emerges. Figure 2 displays the evolution of another 
frequent inequality measure, the Gini coefficient, in a subset of the EU-11 
during the years 1993-2013.2 One can see that inequality was decreasing 
notably until 1999. The pre-, during and post-crisis period brought a more 
hectic pattern, with some, but only partial, reversal of the original declining 
trend by 2013. Inequality in the EU-27 declined during the same period. 
This suggests an overall fall in inequality between countries.
Figure 3 confirms the decline of inequality in the EU-27 in the pre-, during 
and post-crisis period. It shows the average percentage change from 2006 to 
2012 in each ventile of individual income distribution.3 The first dot from the 
left reveals that the average income of the lowest 5% increased by a little 
more than 20%. Similarly, the last dot on the right shows the average income 
of the richest 5% of the EU population decreased by a bit less than 5%. 
There are great differences in growth at the two ends of the income distribution. 
In the lower third, we find that income has increased for each percentile. At the 
same time, income is decreasing at all ventiles above the 30th percentile, more 
and more so as percentile values increase. It seems therefore that the crisis has 
benefitted the poor, but hit everyone from the middle-class upwards.
However, a more nuanced picture emerges from Figure 4 which 
decomposes Figure 3 into country groups. It splits countries into 3 groups: 
North-West Europe, Mediterranean and Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE).4 It shows that the improvement in the position of the bottom 30% 
of households was driven mainly by improvements in the position of 
these households in the CEE Member States. All households lost in both 
the Mediterranean and the North West European Member States. In the 
Mediterranean Member States, the bottom 30% lost more than richer 
households, so inequality increased. In the North Western Member States, 
richer households lost more than the bottom 30%, so inequality decreased. 
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Figure 1. Long term income inequality trends in selected member 
states and some other OECD countries
Note: Inequality of household disposable income. 'Little 
change' in inequality refers to changes of less than 1.5 
percentage points. Data year: 2013 or latest year (2013 
for FI, HU, NL and the United States, 2009 for Japan, and 
2012 for the other countries).
Source: In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), 2015.
Figure 2. The Gini coefficient of net income per household, various EU 
country groups, 1993-2013
Source: JRC calculations based on the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP, 1993-2000) and 
the EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC, 
2004-2013). Both data sources provide income measures 
in a common currency. Income levels were adjusted to 
purchasing power parity differences using OECD data (this 
practice is discussed for example in Brandolini (2007). 
The unit of observation is the household, equipped with 
their corresponding equivalised per capita disposable 
income. In the EU-11, Austria, Finland, Luxembourg and 
Sweden are missing from the EU-15. From the EU-27, 
it is Croatia that is missing. See Benczur et al (2017) for 
further details. 
Figure 3. Changes in the EU wide distribution of equivalised disposable 
income 2006-2012
Source: JRC calculations using EU-SILC.
Figure 4. Changes in the EU-wide distribution of equivalised disposable 
income 2006-2012 by country group
Source: JRC calculations based on EU-SILC.
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To look even deeper into the heterogeneity of income developments among 
Member States, we zoom in on individual countries, but only at the two ends 
of the income distribution. We try to illustrate how income changes move 
certain income groups within individual countries up or down the EU-wide 
income distribution. Figure 5 maps how many percentage points the average 
income in each countries’ lowest (top) and highest (bottom) quintile has 
changed in the ranking of the EU income distribution, from 2006 to 2012.5
At the lower end (see top map), income was decreasing in more than one 
Mediterranean- and some North-West countries, while those with growing 
and stagnant income are a mix of CEE and North-West countries. Increases 
at the top (see bottom map) affect fewer countries.
1.2 The impact of digitisation on income inequality 
and the world of labour
The Routine Biased Technological Change hypothesis predicts that ICT 
developments and digitisation will change the pattern of capital-labour 
substitution. In particular, it will lead to an increase in jobs that are rich in cognitive, 
non-routine tasks – typically high skill jobs – and a decline in jobs rich in routine 
tasks (both cognitive and manual). Many of these require middle level skills and 
are found in the middle of the income distribution. Some routine jobs are of 
the manual type and are at the lower end of the income scale. However, not all 
manual jobs will be eliminated by the digital revolution, as there is an increase in 
demand for manual non-routine jobs, due to population ageing and the increased 
demand for personal services from the richer part of the population.
The result of all this would be job polarisation, i.e. the relative decline of 
mid-skilled jobs and the expansion of low and high-skilled jobs. This could 
lead to a 'thinning out' of the middle class.
The evidence suggests that job polarisation has happened in Europe before, during 
and after the crisis. The crisis may have amplified the polarising trend. However, 
there is no consensus on the extent to which the various European countries have 
been exposed (to routinisation and hence) to job polarisation (see Annex 1).
Job polarisation raises a number of questions for policy makers. For 
example, will the decline in intermediate level jobs make it harder for those 
in low wage jobs to move upwards? What will happen to those displaced 
from mid-range jobs? Will they move into non-routine jobs? If so, will these 
jobs be better or worse? Or are they more likely to become unemployed? 
Unless countervailing action is taken, there is a risk that polarisation could 
create losers, who might feel that they are not getting a fair deal.
In the US, job polarisation has been associated with wage polarisation, i.e. 
a situation where wages grow faster at the extremes of the distribution 
than at the centre. This might be expected if demand for mid-skilled 
workers declines, while demand for high and low-skilled workers increases.
5.  To give an example, suppose 
that the cutoff income value 
of the bottom 20% of a 
given country corresponded 
to the 10th percentile of the 
EU-wide income distribution 
in 2006, while its 2012 value 
would put it into the 15th 
percentile of the 2012 EU 
income distribution. Then the 
increase we put on the map is 
5 percentage points.
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Figure 5. Changes in the lowest (top map) and the highest (bottom map) per 
country quintile disposable income from 2006 to 2012
Source: JRC calculations based on EU-SILC.
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6.  See http://bruegel.
org/2014/07/chart-of-the-
week-54-of-eu-jobs-at-risk-
of-computerisation/.
7.  See Brynjolfsson, E. and 
McAfee, A., Race against the 
Machine: How the Digital 
Revolution is Accelerating 
Innovation, Driving 
Productivity, and Irreversibly 
Transforming Employment 
and the Economy, Digital 
Frontier Press, 2011; 
Brynjolfsson, E. and McAfee, 
A., The Second Machine Age, 
W. W. Norton & Company, 
2014.
8.  International Panel on Social 
Progress draft report.
However, there is no evidence of general wage polarisation in Europe. In 
particular, at the lower end of the scale, there has been a growth in jobs, 
but not in wages (see Annex 1).
Looking to the future
Frey and Osborne (2013) argue that 47% of current US jobs are at risk 
of disappearing, possibly in the next two decades, starting with jobs in 
transportation, logistics and administration support, followed by jobs in 
services, sales and construction (see Figure 6). Computerisation will mostly 
substitute unskilled labour – particularly in the service sector – hence 
putting an end to job polarisation in the US (a fact already suggested by 
existing data).
Applying the same methodology as Frey and Osborne, Bruegel6 found 
that the share of jobs at risk of substitution by ICT is even higher in 
Europe (54%) and particularly in Southern Europe, where employment in 
occupations at high risk of substitution is even higher.
However, Arntz et al. (2016) point out that Frey and Osborne focused on 
jobs as opposed to tasks, which may be inappropriate. They argue that, 
even if some tasks are substitutable by machines, this does not imply that 
the whole job will disappear. They estimate that around 9% of jobs are 
at high risk of substitution, ranging from around 12% of jobs in Austria, 
Germany and Spain to around 6% in Finland and Estonia. 
The question is whether new jobs will be created to replace those being 
lost. This has happened with previous waves of technological change, 
though with major disruptions to the social fabric. However, some7 argue 
that this time may be different. They believe that highly autonomous 
robots may one day be able to carry out most of the tasks currently done 
by human workers. 
Whether or not this happens will depend not just on technological change, 
but also on the relative price changes between human labour and 
machines. 
Over the past decade, the price of capital (interest rates) has declined 
dramatically, much more than the price of labour (wages). This may help to 
explain persistent unemployment. 
However, so far at least, there is no clear evidence of the 'end of work.' 
Official statistics show no structural decline in paid employment between 
1991 and 2014. This is true of all countries at all stages of development.8
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Figure 6. The distribution of occupational employment over the probability of computerisation, using US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics for 2010
Note: The probabilities of substitution are measured on the horizontal axis and they go from 0 to 1. On the vertical axis they measure the 
employment associated to a given probability of substitution by ICT. On the right we have employment in high risk of substitution occupations (also 
by sector). On the left we have the occupations at low risk of substitution. Overall they find that using as threshold values for probability of 0.3 and 
0.7, 47% of US employment lies in occupations that have more than a 70% chance of being substituted.
Source: Frey and Osborne (2013).
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9.  The European Collaborative 
Economy: A research agenda 
for policy support, 2016.
10.  See indicator 2a2 (http://
digital-agenda-data.eu/
datasets/desi/indicators). 
The digital skills indicator 
has been created using 
the Digital Competence 
Framework for European 
Citizens (https://ec.europa.
eu/jrc/digcomp). In order 
to have 'basic skills', an 
individual has to be able 
to carry out activities in 
four areas included in 
the index (information, 
communication, content-
creation and problem-
solving).
11.  See footnote 2 for a 
definition of the Gini index.
The rise of the collaborative economy
It may be that we should no longer be thinking in terms of full time, 
permanent jobs at all. With the rise of the collaborative economy, people 
may increasingly be 'independent service providers' or 'independent 
contractors', rather than employees. Platforms may create jobs for the 
non-active and unemployed. Workers may benefit from greater flexibility 
to choose their working hours and the type of work they pursue. However, 
they may face greater precariousness and a lack of social protection. 
A recent JRC report9 concluded that net effects of labour platforms on 
employment and income inequality are ambiguous, since empirical evidence 
so far is insufficient and inconclusive. It set out a forward looking agenda 
to strengthen the scientific evidence for the development of policies to 
maximise the benefits and minimise the costs for all stakeholders.
The centrality of skills
It is clear that in the new, more fluid, world of work, individuals will have 
to take more responsibility for their own professional development. They 
will have to adapt and remain relevant. However, it is clear that not all 
individuals have the tools that they need to do this. 
For example, the EU-wide Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) 
confirms that digital skills are not equally distributed.10 Figure 7 shows 
that, on average, 55% of individuals in Europe have basic or above basic 
digital skills, 23% have a low level of digital skills and 21.4% have no 
digital skills at all. Taking low and no digital skills together, this means 
that almost half (44.5%) of the EU population has insufficient skills to 
participate in the digital economy and society. Seventeen Member States 
have rates higher than this. In Romania, 74% of the population does not 
have the digital skills they need to function effectively in the digital world.
1.3  Public policy, income inequality and income 
growth
The evidence suggests that direct tax and social benefit systems have 
sizeable redistributive impacts in the EU. Figure 8 displays the Gini index 
of all EU countries measured on gross income and disposable income (i.e. 
income before and after taxes and social benefits apply).11
This figure shows that gross income inequalities vary in a range of Gini 
coefficient between 0.4 and 0.55 and the Gini index is, on average, reduced 
by half, once the tax and social benefits (including public pensions) apply. 
EU countries are also very heterogeneous in the degree of redistribution 
achieved through taxes and social benefits, with no clear connection 
between the level of inequalities in gross and net income. 
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Figure 7. Digital skills of the EU population (% individuals with above basic, basic and low 
digital skills and no internet use)
Figure 8. Income inequality before and after taxes and social benefits in EU countries
Note: Original incomes are defined as market incomes. The impact of the tax and social benefits system is 
measured using the EUROMOD microsimulation model. A static microsimulation model, EUROMOD employs 
the information on individual characteristics and economic circumstances contained in survey data to 
simulate direct taxes liabilities and non-contributory benefit entitlement for a representative sample of 
households in each EU Member State. The data used are from the EU-SILC database for 2008, except for 
France and Malta where 2007 and 2009 are used respectively. For the UK, the Family Resource Survey 
(FRS) for 2008/09 is used. Income is equivalised income defined following the OECD modified scale. The tax 
and social benefit system considered is that of 2010 for all countries. All income and monetary variables 
have been adjusted using appropriate income and price indices, see Sutherland and Figari (2013).
Source: Jara Tamayo and Tumino, 2013
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Tax and social benefits systems also have automatic stabilisation 
properties, which are good at macro-level (to limit falls in demand in major 
crises) and at social level (to reduce income losses during economic crises).
Figure 9 reports recent evidence on the degree of automatic stabilisation 
achieved through the tax and social benefits systems in EU countries. 
The impact of a hypothetical fall in market income will be reduced by 
between 20% and 45% on average across all EU countries and household 
categories, with most of the absorptive property stemming from direct 
personal taxes rather than social insurance contributions (SIC) and social 
benefits (see left-hand panel). Income stabilisation becomes much larger 
and more heterogeneous across EU countries for the poorest households 
(see right-hand panel). For the poorest households, social benefits play by 
far the biggest role for smoothing income shocks, especially in countries 
with the highest degree of automatic stabilisation.
Fiscal balances deteriorated in the Member States because of the crisis, 
resulting, in certain instances, in significant public expenditure cuts and 
tax hikes later on. Figure 10 shows that, in countries that undertook 
major fiscal consolidation programmes, policy measures have tended 
to exacerbate the negative evolution in households´  disposable income. 
However, these policies were not necessarily of a regressive nature. In most 
instances, inequality-reducing and inequality-increasing tax policy reforms 
have occurred with about the same frequency, although the former have 
resulted in significantly higher absolute variation in disposable income.
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Figure 10. The impact of tax and benefit policy changes on disposable 
income and inequality (gini index) in selected EU countries, 2008-2013
Source: JRC simulations based on the EUROMOD model. The simulations make use of 2014 country tax-benefit rules coded in EUROMOD and data 
from the 2012 European Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) and Family Resource Survey for the UK. The automatic stabilisation 
coefficient reported is calculated as  which measures the ratio of the change in disposable and market income of a given household 'i' 
as  a result of shock in market income of 5%. This indicator is based on the approach proposed by Dolls et al. (2012). 
Figure 9. Household-level automatic income stabilisers and decomposition in EU countries
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Source: JRC simulation based on the EUROMOD model 
and on the method developed by Bargain and Callan 
(2010). This approach is based on counterfactual 
scenarios fixing alternatively population, income and 
policy characteristics and using a decomposition 
approach. Income is equivalised income defined following 
the OECD modified scale. The value of the change in the 
Gini index was multiplied by 100. 
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This section examines two non-monetary 
dimensions of multi-dimensional poverty, 
education and health, and asks how outcomes 
in these areas relate to social background. 
If the social background of an individual is 
influential for health and education outcomes, 
this suggests an inequality of opportunity 
across citizens.
Chapter Summary
There is a high degree of inequality of 
opportunity in the EU. A large body of 
academic literature already shows this. 
Our analysis suggests that education and 
health outcomes are closely linked to family 
background. Specifically, this chapter finds 
that:
 f Individuals who have at least one tertiary 
educated parent have twice the chance to 
reach tertiary education themselves.
 f Individuals whose parents have not achieved 
tertiary education have significantly lower 
literacy and numeracy scores. Those who are 
also first or second generation immigrants 
and who report bad health fare even worse. 
This shows that inequality of opportunity 
can be multiple.
 f The chances of reporting poor health for 
those with a poor family background are 
almost 110% higher than for respondents 
with a privileged family background, even 
when biological dimensions (age and gender) 
are accounted for.
Inequality of opportunity2
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2.1 Inequality of opportunity in education
Figure 11 presents the association between parents' and children’s 
education. Adults are divided into those with at least one parent having 
acquired tertiary education and those with neither parent having achieved a 
higher education degree. For each of these two groups, we look at the share 
that has achieved higher education themselves. Then we take the ratio. 
There are equal opportunities in education, if the share of those achieving 
tertiary education is independent of parental education and, as such, 
similar between both groups. This is only the case in Finland, where the 
ratio is close to 1. Finland – discussed in education literature as the 
European country with high educational achievement of students paired 
with low disparities (OECD, 2010) – however is an outlier; consistently 
across Member States, the ratio is considerably above 1. 
The position of the US is interesting. There is a collective belief in America 
that they have a high degree of equality of opportunity in their country. 
They are much less concerned about inequality as a result (Redmond et 
al., 2002; Corak, 2013). Nevertheless, once we compare the US to EU 
countries, the US does not stand out, but rather seems similar in terms of 
the association between parental and offspring’s education. 
On average, across the countries examined, individuals who have at least 
one tertiary educated parent have twice the chance to reach tertiary 
education themselves. 
What drives these differences? Genetics play a minor part in explaining 
educational achievement and hence cannot explain unequal outcomes 
(Nielsen and Roos, 2015; Jerrim et al., 2014). The focus is rather on 
environmental factors and access to resources being determined by social 
capital (Bourdieu, 1986). Families from different social classes differ in 
their capabilities to take advantage of educational opportunities (Feinstein 
et al., 2004).
If an individual's background influences their chances of achieving tertiary 
education, is the same true for more basic knowledge and skills? Figure 12 
shows that individuals whose parents have not achieved tertiary education 
have a literacy score only 89% of that of an adult who has a parent with 
higher education. An 11 percent decline reflects here about two thirds of a 
standard deviation of the literacy skill measure and, as such, is sizable. 
Since inequality of opportunity can be multiple, we also show the 
association of low achievement with immigration and poor health (adding 
those variables as covariates into the skill equation). Immigrants whose 
parents did not achieve tertiary education have 20 percent lower literacy 
skills than their counterparts. Once individuals claim in addition bad health, 
their skills are less than three quarters of those of native adults with good 
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Figure 11. Family background and tertiary education
Note: JRC elaboration, based on 2011/12 micro data of the Study of Adult Skills (Programme for International Student Assessment - PIAAC, OECD 
2016). PIAAC contains nationally representative samples of individuals across EU countries. Average sample size is around 6 000 adults per country.
Figure 12. Average literacy score of individuals in disadvantaged group expressed as percentage of average literacy score of 
advantaged group
Note: The figure provided is the ratio of the literacy score of the disadvantaged and the advantaged group multiplied by 100. For example, the value 
of 88.8 means that, on average, the literacy score of individuals from a disadvantaged group is only 88.8 % of that of an advantaged group. The first 
bar defines the advantaged group as those individuals with at least one parent holding tertiary education and the disadvantaged group as those with 
no parent educated to tertiary level. The second bar compares natives with at last one parent holding tertiary education with immigrants with no parent 
educated to tertiary level. The third bar adds to the advantaged group good health and to the disadvantaged group bad health. Individuals who evaluate 
their health to be fair or poor are defined as having ‘bad health’. Immigrant status refers to both first (adult and parents were born abroad) and second 
(adult born in country, both parents born abroad) generation immigrants. The predictions are based on country fixed effects and include the following 
countries: Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Poland, Slovak Republic, 
Spain, Sweden and the UK.
Source: JRC, calculations based on Programme for International Student Assessment (PIAAC) 2012.
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health and tertiary educated parents. The increasing gap between the 
groups focused on shows that each of the characteristics examined exerts 
an independent ‘effect’. If we look at numeracy skills instead of literacy 
skills, results are similar.
2.2 Inequality of opportunity and health: Influence of 
childhood conditions
There is a large literature suggesting that health status during adult life 
is partly determined by childhood conditions. Jusot et al, (2013), Tubeuf 
and Jusot (2011), Trannoy et al (2010), Rosa-Dias (2009) or Case et al 
(2005) document that, in addition to the association between the socio-
economic gradient and health, there is also a long-lasting effect of family 
circumstances during childhood on adult health. Jusot et al (2013) and 
Trannoy et al (2010) show that, in France, health inequalities would be 
halved, if the effect of family circumstances was removed. Similarly, Rosa-
Dias (2009) reports that more than one fifth of health inequalities during 
adult life is driven by inequality of opportunity. 
Some additional findings on the relationship between health and family 
circumstances are presented below. 
Figure 13 displays the ratio of the share of respondents reporting 
bad health by father's education (i.e. father without and with tertiary 
education). This ratio should be approximately equal to 1 were the family 
circumstances are not related to health.
It is clear that growing up in family where the father has a low level of 
education is positively associated with the likelihood to report poor health. 
We observe large differences across countries. While in Portugal, Poland 
and Slovenia, respondents whose fathers are poorly educated are more 
than two and a half times more likely to report poor health than their 
counterparts, the opposite is found in the Netherlands and Germany, two 
countries displaying a lower level of inequality of opportunity.  
In order to go a little further in the analysis, we then study the family 
circumstance gradient in health, while controlling for important other 
determinants of health, such as biological factors and effort-related 
variables. The results are summarised in Figure 14.
• The first bar in Figure 14 shows that the respondents whose father 
does not have a tertiary education are, on average, 56% more likely 
to report a poor health status than their counterparts whose father 
has a higher level of education. 
• The second bar displays the health penalty when, in addition 
to a father without tertiary education, two other unfavourable 
circumstances are added: (i) father born in a different country from 
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Figure 13. Family background and self-reported poor health
Source: JRC calculations based on the European Social Survey, 2014. The figure is the ratio of the share of respondents 
reporting bad health by father's education (father without and with tertiary education).
Figure 14. Family circumstances and self-reported poor health – multivariate analysis
Source: JRC calculations based on the European Social Survey, 2014. Figures are based on the estimation of health equations. The dependent 
variable takes the value one if the respondents report to be in fair, poor or very poor health and zero otherwise. Because of the binary nature of the 
outcome variable, a probit model is used. Country dummies are included in all estimates. The first bar is based on an estimation where the father's 
education is the only family circumstance variable. The second bar is derived from an estimation where the three family circumstances described 
above are included among the covariates. The third bar is based on an estimate where, in addition to the family circumstances, the age (in a nonlinear 
fashion) and gender of the respondents are partialled out. The fourth bar is drawn from an estimate where we control also for the health behaviours 
(smoking, physical activity and overweight) and the level of education of the respondents.
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12.  The comparison group is 
made of the respondents 
(i) whose father has a 
tertiary education and (ii) is 
born in the country where 
the interview is taking 
place and who (iii) did not 
experience always or often 
financial difficulties during 
childhood.
13.  The effect of family 
circumstances drops a bit 
because of compositional 
effects (i.e. positive 
correlation between 
unfavourable family 
circumstances and age).
14.  Source: JRC calculations 
based on European Social 
Survey, 2012 & 2014.
the one where the respondent is living and (ii) experience of severe 
financial difficulties in the family during childhood. In that context, 
the chances of reporting poor health are 142% higher than for 
individuals having experienced good family conditions.12
• The third bar shows the effect of all three unfavourable family 
circumstances when we account for the age and the gender of the 
respondents, two biological dimensions associated with health. 
The chances of reporting poor health for those with poor family 
background are still almost 110% higher than for respondents with a 
privileged family background.13
• Unhealthy behaviours are responsible for a large part of health 
issues. This is in particular the case of tobacco use, poor diet, or lack 
of physical activities. The last bar of Figure 14 displays the health 
penalty associated with the three unfavourable family circumstances 
when the health behaviours and the education level of the 
respondents are accounted for. In this case, the chances of reporting  
poor health are 62% higher for respondents with a poor family 
background, compared to those with favourable family conditions. 
• Health behaviours somehow capture respondents’ effort to invest 
in good health. However, they are not independent of family 
circumstances. Individuals with a poor family background are more 
likely to smoke or be overweight or obese than their counterparts 
from a privileged family background and they are less likely to have 
exercised in the past seven days.14
• Family background therefore has a direct effect on individuals' health 
and an indirect effect via health behaviours. The fourth bar, where 
health behaviours are controlled for, does not therefore capture the 
indirect effects of family background. The third bar, where health 
behaviours are not controlled for, captures both the direct and 
indirect effects of family background. 
This analysis suggests that, in Europe, health status is still largely 
determined by family circumstances. 
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As well as their family background, an 
individual's chances in life are determined by 
the opportunities available to them in their 
geographical context. This chapter therefore 
deals with the spatial aspects of fairness. 
It focuses, firstly, on socio-economic factors 
which are not randomly distributed in space 
(i.e. they have a geographical pattern). 
Secondly, it focuses, not on first nature 
geographical differences which cannot be 
changed (such as the presence of mountains), 
but on second nature geographical factors 
(such as access to basic services or 
hospitals) which can be altered and which are 
important in overcoming a region's natural 
disadvantages. It then links the two.
Chapter Summary
This chapter explores the spatial dimension 
of fairness. It finds that:
 f A number of key socio-economic factors (e.g. 
share of people with a tertiary education 
and unemployment) have a geographical 
pattern.
 f  Second nature geographical factors (for 
example, accessibility to basic services and 
degree of urbanisation) also vary across 
regions.
 f  There is a relationship between these 
socio-economic factors and second nature 
geographical factors, suggesting that they 
may reinforce each other.
The spatial aspects  
of fairness
3
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3.1 Socio‑economic factors with a geographical 
pattern
These include, among others, GDP per capita, income inequality, 
unemployment, crime and the share of people with tertiary education, which 
is shown in Figure 15. This figure shows that the lowest share of people with 
tertiary education is in the Mediterranean countries (with the exception of 
Spain) and in Eastern countries (with the exception of Poland). Interestingly, 
there are no observable territorial differences within these countries, unlike 
the ones with highest share of people with tertiary education. 
The spatial dimension of unemployment (Figure 16) shows that the highest 
levels are in the Mediterranean countries (Spain and Greece), with a strong 
divide between north and south Italy. In the other countries, there is a 
much more random spatial pattern which may be determined by specific 
local labour conditions or by the capacity of regions to respond to the 
changing global environment following the crisis.
3.2 Second nature geographical factors
Second nature geographical factors include the degree of urbanisation, 
access to services and road accessibility. The first map (Figure 17) displays 
the accessibility to basic services in the NUTS315 (Nomenclature of 
Territorial Units for Statistics 3) regions of Europe, i.e. the average distance 
per person to the nearest facility. A quite random spatial pattern is shown 
but with some regularities. The first is that sparsely populated areas, 
which are typically in Scandinavian countries, have less accessibility. The 
second is that country capitals and some other cities have higher access 
to basic services. The third is that Benelux and England have the largest 
agglomerations of the most accessible regions.
The degree of urbanisation (Figure 18) is recognised as a key development 
factor by the new economic geography, which was developed in the 1990s 
by Paul Krugman. Urbanised areas in Europe are quite clustered within the 
Member States, and the main cities (in red) are not always surrounded by 
towns and suburbs. This happens where various cities are located close to 
one another, like in Germany, Italy, Poland and the south of Spain. When 
this happens, cities tend to be 'isolated islands' in the middle of rural areas 
(Kompil et al., 2015).
3.3 The relationship between socio‑economic factors 
and second nature geographical factors
Examples of this relationship are shown below. The aim is not to look for any 
type of causality or statistical correlation, but just to get an overview of the 
possible interpretation of a complex phenomenon using some visual tools. 
15.  The NUTS classification 
(Nomenclature of territorial 
units for statistics) is a 
hierarchical system for 
dividing up the economic 
territory of the EU for the 
purpose of the collection, 
development and 
harmonisation of European 
regional statistics, the socio-
economic analyses of the 
regions, and the framing of 
EU regional policies.)
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Figure 15. Tertiary education in 2015
Figure 17. Accessibility to basic services Figure 18. Degree of urbanisation
Figure 16: Unemployment rate in 2015
Source: EUROSTAT; JRC elaboration, 2017.
Source: LUISA Territorial Modelling Platform, 2017. Source: LUISA Territorial Modelling Platform, 2017.
Source: EUROSTAT; JRC elaboration, 2016.
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In Figure 19, the x-axis shows the countries, while the y-axis shows the 
share of population aged 30-34 with tertiary education. The colours of 
the bubbles correspond to the type of region. A quick look at the figure 
shows that, in cities, the percentage of population with tertiary education is 
always higher than in towns and rural areas, while the gap between towns 
and rural areas does not follow a regular pattern. Finally, the gap between 
cities and the rest of the regions is higher in Eastern and Mediterranean 
countries (with the exception of Spain and Italy), pointing to a more unfair 
territorial environment.
Figure 20 shows the relation between the average access to basic services 
(on the y-axis) by regional typology per country (on the x-axis). There is a 
big gap between the metropolitan and non-metropolitan regions in Europe, 
where metropolitan regions have higher accessibility to services, i.e. lower 
average distance per person to the nearest facility. The Netherlands, 
the UK, Belgium and Italy are among the countries with the highest 
accessibility, with highly urbanised environments. On the contrary, Finland, 
Ireland and Estonia are among the countries with lowest accessibility, due 
to the wider non-metropolitan structure. However, the metropolitan regions 
in these countries provide similar conditions to other metropolitan regions 
of Europe in terms of access to basic services.
T H E  S P A T I A L  A S P E C T S   O F  F A I R N E S S 31
Figure 19. Tertiary education vs. degree of urbanisation
Figure 20. Access to basic services by metropolitan regions
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Access to basic service areas/facilities by metro regions, 2011 
Average distance per person to the nearest facility 
National Average
Metro Region Capital
Other Metro Regions
Non Metro Regions
EU-28 Average
< 500,000
500,000 -1,000,000
1,000,000 - 2,500,000
> 2,500,000
Metro Region Population
Note: ranked by the city value.
Source: EUROSTAT.
Source: LUISA (Land-Use based Integrated Sustainability Assessment ) Territorial Modelling Platform – based on the GEOSTAT 2011 population grid. 
The LUISA Territorial Modelling Platform is primarily used for the ex-ante evaluation of EC policies that have a direct or indirect territorial impact. It 
is based on the concept of ‘land function’ for cross-sector integration and for the representation of complex system dynamics. Beyond a traditional 
land use model, LUISA adopts a new approach towards activity-based modelling based upon the endogenous dynamic allocation of population, 
services and activities.
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The previous chapters set out evidence on 
different inequalities. They present measured 
inequalities but they do not tell us how people 
might be perceiving, or experiencing, them.
To understand this better, this chapter looks 
at data measuring people’s perceptions of 
inequalities. It asks whether these perceptions 
match reality. It looks at what influences 
them and whether there is an appetite for 
government intervention to reduce inequality. 
It also examines attitudes to fairness. How do 
people decide what is or is not fair?
Chapter summary
 f Data from 2009 suggests that a majority 
of people believe that income differences in 
their country are too large. Are they over-
estimating these differences? They may 
be; there is evidence that this sometimes 
happens. However, the 2009 data indicate 
that concern about inequality does mirror 
measured inequality, at least to some 
extent. 
 f The more people agree that income 
differences are too large in their country, the 
more they are in favour of the government 
reducing income differences. The mandate 
for re-distribution in 2009 was considerable 
in all European countries examined (with 
more than 50 percent in favour). 
 f The 2009 data indicate that people may be 
more likely to tolerate income inequality if 
they perceive there to be a high degree of 
equality of opportunity, though this attitude 
is most prevalent in the US. However, 
Chapter 2 of this report suggests that this 
is not the case. There is a high degree of 
inequality of opportunity in both Europe 
and the US. Equally, popular perceptions 
of inequality of opportunity are only 
weakly linked to objective measures of 
the same phenomenon but may be shaped 
by other country characteristics, such as 
wealth and growth. Chapter 2 seems to 
indicate that, although Americans are more 
convinced than Europeans that they have 
a high degree of equality of opportunity 
in their country, the US is actually similar 
to European countries in terms of the 
association between parental and offspring’s 
education.
 f What about inequality due to good or bad 
luck (rather than effort or opportunity)? 
Attitudes towards this type of inequality 
appear to be culturally determined. 
 f We know that perceptions of fairness are 
highly influenced by reference points but do 
people in different countries and regions use 
different points of comparison? This might 
explain why, even though different countries 
and regions have undergone changes in 
different directions, populist disaffection is 
on the rise everywhere.
 f People care not just about 'distributive 
justice' – the share of resources or 
opportunities they get – but also how the 
decision was taken – i.e. 'procedural justice'. 
Perceptions4
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4.1 Perceptions of inequality
The first question is whether people perceive the magnitude of inequality 
similarly to commonly measured inequality. There is relatively little 
literature exploring this topic. However, some recent empirical contributions 
in psychology and economics have shown that the perception of inequality 
reported by people in opinion surveys does not correspond to income 
inequality as it is commonly measured (Chambers et al., 2014; Gimpelson 
& Treisman, 2015). Other contributions have shown that a society’s 
structure can be perceived as less equitable than it really is (Niehues, 
2014). These contributions do not explore the factors which might explain 
this misperception of inequality.
The second question is the extent to which people are prepared to tolerate 
inequality, in other words, the extent to which they see it as justifiable 
or acceptable. Figure 21 indicates that, in 2009, there was a high level 
of concern about inequality, particularly in EU Member States. In all 
the countries examined, the majority of individuals agreed that income 
differences in their country were too large. The lowest percentage agreeing 
was in Norway, with as many as 60%, and the highest was in Hungary, with 
97%. We include the US in the country comparisons, since this country is 
well known to differ in terms of inequality levels and perceptions (Redmond 
et al., 2002). 
It seems that concern about inequality to some extent mirrors measured 
inequality. There is a slight association between concern of citizens about 
inequality and income inequality, with a correlation among European 
countries of 0.35. 
Figure 22 shows that the more people agree that income differences are 
too large in a country, the more they are in favour of government reducing 
income differences. The mandate for government redistribution was 
huge in all European countries examined, with more than 50 percent of 
individuals in favour. 
Among those agreeing that income differences were too large, more than 
80% thought that the government should reduce these income differences. 
Perceived inequality seems therefore to be a driver of individuals’ attitudes 
towards redistribution. 
It may be that people feel that inequality of outcomes is more acceptable 
if they believe that there is a high degree of equality of opportunity, i.e. if 
it is hard work that determines an individual’s success rather than factors 
beyond their control (such as race, gender, coming from a wealthy family 
or who they know). Figure 23 shows that the higher the percentage of 
people in a country believing that, in their country, hard work is important 
for getting ahead, the lower the percentage of people wanting the 
government to intervene to reduce inequality. However, this negative 
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Figure 21. Percent of individuals agreeing that income differences are too large in their 
country and 80 to 20 quintile income ratio
Note: The y-axis shows the percent 
of individuals (strongly) agreeing that 
income differences are too large in their 
country (in contrast to other individuals 
who chose to answer ‘neither nor agree’, 
‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’). The 
x-axis provides the 80 to 20 percentile 
income ratio derived from Eurostat for 
European countries and OECD for US. 
For example, a value of 5 means that 
the individuals at the 80th percentile of 
the income distribution earn five times 
more than those at the 20th percentile 
of the income distribution. Correlation 
coefficient is 0.35 excluding US and 
-0.09 including US. JRC elaboration.
Source: International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP) 2009.
Figure 22. Perception of too large income differences go together with agreement that 
the government should reduce them
Source: ISSP 2009 on percent (strongly) 
agreeing that income differences are too 
large (in contrast to the other answer 
categories ‘neither nor agree’, ‘disagree’, 
‘strongly disagree’) and (strongly) 
agreeing that the government should 
reduce income differences. Correlation 
coefficient is 0.90 excluding US and 0.91 
including US. JRC elaboration.
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Figure 23. Association between agreement that hard work is important and that 
government should reduce income inequality
Source: ISSP 2009. Correlation coefficient 
-0.47 with US and -0.18 without US. JRC 
elaboration.
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16.  Inequality will next be 
covered by the ISSP in 
2019, with data becoming 
available in 2021.
17.  In the ultimatum game, 
the first player (proposer) 
receives a sum of money 
and proposes how to 
divide the sum between 
the proposer and the other 
player. The second player 
(the responder) chooses 
to either accept or reject 
the proposal. The game is 
typically played only once. 
correlation coefficient of -0.47 is mainly driven by the US where the belief 
in equal opportunities is highest and the agreement with government 
interventions for tackling inequality is lowest among the countries 
considered.
It seems, therefore, that the perceived degree of equal opportunity 
may be one of the factors influencing peoples’ tolerance of inequality. 
However, Brunori (2015) has shown that, in Europe, individuals perceive 
equal opportunities within their country quite differently to those 
measured by scholars, as illustrated in Figure 24.
It appears that, although popular perceptions of inequality of opportunity 
are only weakly linked to objective measures of the same phenomenon, 
they may, strangely, be shaped by other country characteristics, such as 
wealth and growth. In richer, more dynamic countries, perceived inequality 
of opportunity is lower (Brunori, 2015). 
In addition, income inequality and perceived inequality of opportunity 
could be related. Figure 25 reveals a slight association between inequality 
of outcome in a country and the percent of individuals who believe that 
coming from a wealthy family is important in determining socio-economic 
success.
Brunori (2015) found that individual experiences play a role in the 
perception of equality of opportunity. Those who have experienced 
unemployment or downward inter-generational mobility are more likely 
to perceive a lower degree of equality of opportunity in their country. 
This suggests the existence of a self-esteem bias (those who have good 
reasons to perceive their experiences in the labour market as a failure 
over-emphasise the role of external causes in determining socio-economic 
outcomes in order to preserve their self-esteem).
Several notes of caution are important for interpreting the figures given 
above. Most use data from 2009.16 They do not necessarily tell us what 
is happening in 2017. Comparing with perceptions of inequality and the 
need for government intervention from earlier decades, they seem to have 
remained relatively stable (Redmond et al., 2002). The current drastic 
changes in the political landscape, however, could suggest that there 
have been dramatic changes in perceptions or tolerance of inequality 
during recent years. This shows the need for more data and more in-depth 
analysis of it. 
4.2 Attitudes towards fairness
Behavioural science research confirms that human beings care deeply 
about fairness. A key finding is that people strongly resent unfair treatment 
when it is disadvantageous to them. This has been demonstrated through 
ultimatum games17, which are used in behavioural economics experiments. 
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Figure 24. Perceived and measured inequality of opportunity only weakly linked
Note: The x-axis provides a measure of Inequality of Opportunity (IOp) as the share of total inequality due to exogenous variables ranked by country. 
The y-axis provides a country rank of a perception measure of inequality of opportunity.
Source: Brunori, 2015.
Figure 25. Percent of individuals responding that coming from a wealthy family is essential or very important for getting ahead 
in their country and 80 to 20 percentile income ratio
Source: International Social Survey Programme 2009 – y-axis: percentage responding wealth to be essential or very important for getting ahead (in 
contrast to the other answer categories ‘fairly important’, ‘not very important’, ‘not important at all’); x-axis: 80:20 percentile income ratio derives from 
Eurostat for European countries and OECD for US. Correlation coefficient is 0.35 excluding US and 0.26 including US. JRC elaboration.
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Indeed, in ultimatum games, subjects consistently prefer both players to 
receive nothing than for they themselves to receive less than the other 
player (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze B, 1982). This is surprising, since 
it would usually be better to receive something (even if it is less than the 
other player) than nothing. It undermines the idea, prevalent in economics, 
that agents always behave rationally. It shows that an attachment to 
fairness also guides our behaviour.
This instinctual aversion to getting less than others seems to develop in 
humans at an early age. It has also been found in capuchin monkeys and 
chimpanzees, suggesting that it is an innate, evolved behaviour, which pre-
dates our species (Brosnan & de Waal, 2014).
Moreover, unlike animals, humans sometimes also balk at receiving more 
than other people (so-called advantageous inequity) (Fehr & Schmidt, 
1999). This may not be an innate behaviour but one which is learned 
through socialisation and which varies across cultures. It challenges the 
assumption in traditional economics that agents always act in their own 
self-interest. 
Unfairness has both negative behavioural and psychological consequences. 
For instance, in ultimatum games, those receiving unfair treatment 
experience negative emotions, such as spite (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, 
Nystrom & Cohen, 2003), and their happiness ratings decrease (Tabibnia, 
Satpute & Lieberman, 2008). From a societal perspective, unfairness 
may also jeopardise social cohesion, as the above-mentioned emotional 
responses to unfairness could lead to feelings of being excluded from 
society. 
Perceptions of fairness are highly influenced by reference points, a 
phenomenon called the anchoring heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
This means that people will base their fairness judgment of the outcome of 
a given behaviour at least partly on a comparison of the situation of others 
or a situation that occurred in the past. 
The question is whether people in different countries and regions use 
different points of comparison. For example, inequality is declining in Central 
and Eastern European Member States. However, people there may be 
comparing their situation, not to that of other people in their own country but 
to the situation of people in other, typically richer, countries. Inequality is also 
declining in North West European Member States. However, people there may 
take no consolation from this, since their standard of living is also falling. 
In other words, they may be comparing their situation, not to that of other 
people, but to their own situation in the past. One can also ask whether they 
compare their current situation only with the recent past, or whether longer-
term trends also influence their perceptions.
There is also evidence that attitudes to fairness are culturally influenced. 
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Recent experimental research (Almas, Cappelen & Tungodden, 2016) 
comparing attitudes in Norway and the US found that, people in both 
countries are prepared to accept inequality based on merit or the 
contribution that people have made. They feel that inequality due to 
family background or other factors, such gender, is not justified. However, 
Americans and Norwegians disagree when it comes to inequality resulting 
simply from luck. Americans are more willing to accept it than Norwegians. 
This may explain why Norwegians prefer higher levels of government 
intervention to mitigate inequality. 
Individuals base their judgment of fairness not only on the outcome of a 
behaviour, i.e. 'distributive justice' – the share of resources or opportunities 
they get – but also how the decision was taken, i.e. the so-called 
'procedural justice' (Blader & Tyler, 2003; Walker, Lind, & Thibaut, 1979). 
Some authors even argue that 'procedural justice' is more important than 
the fairness of the outcome in determining people's overall perception of 
fairness (van den Bos et al., 1997). 'Procedural justice' can be achieved by 
giving people a voice and by maintaining standards of neutrality among 
decision makers.
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Building an EU which citizens consider fair, is a colossal challenge. DG JRC 
will support policy makers in the Commission as they grapple with it. It 
will work with them to determine the priorities for future research. At this 
stage, it believes that it can contribute to the following areas.
Perceptions
More work is needed to fully understand what drives people's perceptions 
of fairness. Is it income distribution, as this report suggests, or do other 
factors, such as migration, have more to do with it? Do these perceptions 
drive voting behaviour? Can they explain the current upsurge in discontent? 
DG JRC will seek to find responses to these questions. 
Monitoring metrics and indicators
This report (Chapters 1 and 3) has shown that a serious investigation of 
fairness must focus on both the supra- and sub-national level, as well as 
the national level. Working solely with country-level distributions might be 
insufficient because it risks missing the way these distributions relate to 
each other across countries, as well as the regional dimension as a major 
determinant of disparities within countries. It also risks missing the reasons 
behind the popular discontent, since these may depend on cross-country 
comparisons and probably vary from one region to another. 
DG JRC will therefore develop a socio-economic atlas of Europe. This will 
present socio-economic data at different levels of geographical aggregation. 
The impact of digitisation on labour markets
There are a large number of researchers, in different institutions, who are active 
in this field. DG JRC will ensure that policy makers are kept fully abreast of all 
the knowledge generated and that it is presented to them in a digestible form. 
In addition, it will pursue its ongoing work to determine how robust the 
evidence on routinisation and job polarisation is (Biagi and Sebástian 
Lago, 2017). There is currently no unanimous definition of what routine 
tasks are. Different authors have used different definitions of routinisation, 
which they have then applied to different datasets, using different 
empirical methodologies. DG JRC will therefore try to determine to what 
extent the different results obtained are due to the different definitions, 
methodologies and data sets.
Finally, DG JRC will study the impact of digital labour market platforms 
on employment and income inequality, using a combined analysis of 
platforms' data and surveys of platform workers and customers. 
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Figure 26. Multi-dimensionality of inequality of opportunity
A ‑ Income 
B ‑ Health 
C - Housing 
D - Finance 
E - Nutrition 
F - Mobility 
G - Green areas 
H - Social Network 
I ‑ Education 
J - Neighbourhood 
K - Security/crime 
L - Digital acces 
M - Energy 
N - Legal/justice 
O - Health care 
P - ...
Taxation
DG JRC will continue to be active in this area. In particular, it envisages two 
pieces of work:
• The first concerns the convergence of unemployment benefit 
schemes in Europe. This issue is very relevant for the idea of 
benchmarking social benefits systems, especially in the EMU context. 
The focus is on whether such convergence would affect disposable 
income, income distribution, public expenditures and incentives to 
work in countries lagging behind (i.e. countries with less generous 
unemployment benefit systems).
• The second concerns the automatic stabilisation properties of tax 
and social benefits systems. As stated in section 1.3, these are good 
at both a macro-economic and a social level. However, both these 
effects differ in nature depending on starting income levels. DG JRC 
therefore emphasizes the need for a disaggregated analysis, i.e. at 
income decile level. 
Inequality of opportunity – a multi‑dimensional approach
Work is ongoing in DG JRC to define equality of opportunity, measure it 
(i.e. distinguish between outcome inequality due to effort and outcome 
inequality due to exogenous circumstances, such as gender, race or family 
background) and to explore its policy implications. 
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Chapter 2 of this report also showed that inequality of opportunity is 
multi-dimensional and that any thorough study on this topic should try 
to address this multidimensional aspect. There is a large number of 
dimensions to consider (see Figure 26). While there are lots of studies 
on individual linkages between two dimensions (e.g. between health 
and housing), it is important to go further, by combining these different 
linkages, to understand how all the various dimensions influence and 
reinforce each other.
Chapter 3 explained that there are large spatial disparities across 
regions in Europe, in terms of tertiary education, but also access to 
services. Studies, such as Chetty and Hendren, 2015 or Chetty et al., 
2016, have shown that individuals living in poor neighbourhoods during 
childhood underperform on a large set of outcomes, ranging from health, 
education to living conditions, compared to individuals located in richer 
neighbourhoods. In addition, these studies, as well as Vartanian et al., 
2007, van Ham et al.,  2010, or Vuijst et al., 2015, suggest that there is a 
strong inter-generational transmission of neighbourhood status. Children 
growing up in a low-income neighbourhood are very likely to live in 
comparable poor neighbourhoods when adults. 
DG JRC will therefore engage in a comprehensive study, making use of its 
combined statistical and geographical information system expertise, to 
study socio-economic and spatial circumstances simultaneously. Success 
will depend on the richness of the available data and the degree to which 
linkages can be made. 
For example, if individual data can be linked with geographical data at 
a high level of granularity, it will be possible to study how educational 
performance is linked to both family circumstances and neighbourhood 
environments. If individual longitudinal data (tracing individuals through 
multiple years) can be linked with geographical data, the long-term impact 
of neighbourhood location during childhood could be further investigated. 
Behavioural sciences
The potential of behavioural sciences to reduce inequalities of 
opportunities is a promising field of research. For example, stereotypes 
based on nationality, ethnicity, gender, age, handicap or sexual orientation 
hamper some social groups' opportunities on the labour market. While this 
social categorisation often happens unconsciously, behavioural sciences 
can help reduce it. In this context, potential avenues for research at 
EU level include the investigation of the drivers of (e.g. cross-national) 
stereotypes and the development of behaviourally-informed tools to 
'debias' recruitment procedures with the aim of making them fairer.
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Annex 
Annex 1: Job but not wage polarisation in Europe
Goos et al. (2014) find that job polarisation occurred in all the EU countries 
considered during the period 1993-2010, with the exception of Finland 
and Luxembourg. Naticchioni et al. (2014) suggest that ICT investment is 
positively correlated with job polarisation. The OECD (2016) also confirms 
the job polarisation hypothesis for selected OECD countries in the period 
1990-2012, but predicts that such effects will disappear in the long run. 
Evidence supporting job polarisation is also found by Michaels et al. (2014) 
over the period 1980-2004 for US, Japan and nine EU countries. 
Macias and Hurley (2016) show that job polarisation is observed in some 
countries but, for many Member States, there is evidence in favour of 
occupational upgrading (growth in all the sector-occupation cells). The 
existence of large across-country differences is confirmed in Eurofound 
(2016) for the period 2011-2015.
A JRC study (Consoli and Sanchez Barrioluengo) looked at long-term 
transformations of local labour markets in fifty Spanish provinces to 
identify the extent and the drivers of employment polarisation. It found 
that the decline in ‘routine’ mid-skill jobs is strongly driven by technology 
adoption and that it is a strong predictor of the expansion of low-skill 
service employment.
Naticchioni et al. (2014) find that the evidence does not show generalised 
wage polarisation. Mild wage polarisation has been found in the UK (Machin, 
2011) and in Germany (Antonczyk et al., 2010; Dustmann et al., 2009). 
Eurofound (2013) examined wage and job polarisation in the EU and in 
individual Member States before the crisis (1995-2007) and during the 
crisis (2008-2010). The crisis appears to have added to the pre-existing 
polarisation for the EU as a whole: changes in employment across the 
wage distribution during the subsequent recession were much larger than 
those prior to the recession (Eurofound, 2013). However, when countries 
are analysed separately, large country differences emerge. 
Recent JRC work (Naticchioni et al. 2017) finds that workers employed in 
routine jobs are more likely to exit from the labour market (i.e. become 
unemployed or inactive), relative to workers employed in non-routine jobs. 
This effect, which is stronger for young workers, has increased after 2008. The 
study also documents that workers employed in routine jobs are more likely 
to move to non-routine jobs. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis 
that routine jobs are becoming both more 'risky' and less numerous.
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